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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
.of the accident is only a misdemeanor. 4 However, the trial court allowed the
jury to decide, on the evidence, whether a felony had been committed and whether
the homicide was justifiable under section 1055 of the Penal Law. The Court
indicated that since the decedent had not committed a felony the question of
justifiable homicide should not have been submitted to the jury. Such instruction
was clear error. However, it was unavailable to appellant since no exception had
been taken to this portion of the charge.
The degree of force which may be employed by a police officer in the apprehension of a fleeing misdemeanant has been closely restricted. To justify the
taking of a human life it must be shown that a felony has actually been committed.41 In cases of suspected felonies the officer acts at his peril.
Negligence - City Not Liable for Death of Pedestrian Forced into the
Street by Sidewalk Obstruction
In Morello v.Brookfield Construction Co.,42 Philip Morello was hit by an
automobile while crossing beneath a newly constructed overpass, and died of the
sustained injuries. The administratrix and wife of the deceased brought an action
based on negligence and nuisance against the automobile driver, construction
company, electrical contractor, and city-the theory being that insufficient lighting
affected the driver's visibility and that debris on the north sidewalk had forced
the deceased pedestrian into the road.
The trial jury absolved all defendants except the automobile driver, having
determined that the insufficient lighting was not in any way, causally or proximately, related to the accident, but that the sole cause of the accident was the driver's
negligence. The trial judge had previously dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action
sounding in nuisance as "merged" with the negligence count, and eleminated the
plaintiff's "debris theory" as not supported by sufficient evidence. Whether these
acts of the trial judge, as affirmed by the Appellate Division,43 were warranted
and proper was the question presented to the Court of Appeals.
The majority of the Court decided that the trial court acted properly in
dismissing the nuisance count. Where a nuisance arises solely from negligence,
the nuisance and negligence elements may be so intertwined as to be practically in40. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §70(5)(a).
41. Conraddy v. People, 5 Parker Cr. Rep. 234 (1862); Magar v. Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 76 N.E. 474 (1906).
42. 4 N.Y.2d 83, 172 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1958).
43. Morello v. Brookfield Construction Co., 2 A.D.2d 849, 156 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1st Dep't 1956).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
separable4 4 and any attempt to separate them is a useless task. 45 In such a case
as this one, the single wrong done may be characterized as either negligence
or nuisance,46 and it does no harm if presented to the jury in only one aspect.
This situation is to be differentiated from one where the nuisance is an absolute
nuisance, involving the creation of obnoxious or hazardous conditions irrespec47
tive of negligence.
The majority also concluded that the plaintiff's "debris theory" was not supported by the evidence. The only witnesses to the accident were the occupants
of the car, who could not testify as to which direction the deceased pedestrian
was facing or walking. Even assuming the deceased had been on the north sidewalk, the debris did not render the sidewalk impassable48 and whether Morello
was forced off the sidewalk is mere speculation.
The dissent, while recognizing that the evidence was not overwhelming,
believed that a reasonable inference could be drawn as to why the deceased
crossed the street at the point of the accident. Mforello was expected home from
work at the time, and the location of his employment in relation to his home
suggests that he was crossing from the north side. Although the north sidewalk
was not impassable, it was hazardous because of chunks of dirt and stone.
Whether this debris forced the deceased into the road should have been decided
by the jury.
Courts are reluctant to make decisions on slight probabilities, but such
problems often arise where the victim is deceased. The liberal viewpoint of the
dissent seems to be the more practical in recognizing 49 this problem.
Liability of State for Absence of Highway Warning Signs
In Hicks v. State,"0 plaintiffs, occupants of two cars involved in a collision,
charged the state traffic commission with negligence in removing a "stop" sign
at the intersection of a state and county highway and replacing it with a standard
44. McNutty v. Ludwig & Co., 153 App.Div. 206, 213, 138 N.Y.Supp. 84, 90
(2d Dep't 1912).
45. Khoury v. County of Saratoga, 267 N.Y. 384, 389, 196 N.E. 299, 300
(1935).
46. McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 345, 160 N.E. 391,
392 (1928).
47. Ibid.
48. See O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930),

allowing plaintiff a recovery where the sidewalk was impassable.

49. In a death case, a plaintiff is not held to as high a degree of proof

of the cause of action as where an injured plaintiff can himself describe the occurrence. See Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 76, 80 N.E.2d 744
(1948).
50. 3 A.D.2d 106, 159 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1956); 4 N.Y.2d 1, 171 N.Y.S. 827
(1958).

